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Intellectual Property Laws in Harmony with NAFTA:
The Courts as Mediators Between the Global and the Local
Myra J. Tawfik †
Free trade is not a principle; it is an expedient. 1
Legal diversity is . . . an inherent element, and even an
inherent good, within the free trade structure. 2

are not necessarily complementary and may, in fact, conflict.
It is no secret that the rules in NAFTA that constituted ‘‘adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights’’ were those that
were defined by the policy of the United States. These
rules reflected the perspective of the most prodigious
global exporter of IP products and services. Not surprisingly then, the agreement sought to maximize the protection and enforcement of IP rights throughout the
region and to eliminate the barriers to the free flow of IP
products.
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n January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade
Agreement 3 (NAFTA) came into force. NAFTA was
significant for a number of reasons, not the least of
which was that it was the first regional trade agreement
to expressly entrench intellectual property (IP) standards.
The treaty’s stated objective in relation to IP was to
‘‘provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights’’ in each NAFTA
country. 4 This objective manifested itself in the series of
provisions that comprise Chapter 17 of NAFTA.
These obligations became binding law in Canada
by virtue of the North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act 5 (NIA) resulting in amendments to
Canada’s IP statutes, including the Copyright Act, the
Trade-marks Act and the Patent Act. 6
The Preamble to the NIA demonstrates the way in
which Canada internalized its NAFTA commitments:

All things being equal, the principles of free trade in
IP products could result in the salutary outcomes suggested by Parliament in the NIA. However, it is equally
possible that, in the asymmetric power structure that
inheres within the partnership, Canadian creativity and
innovation and, indeed, Canada’s very national identity
would be progressively stifled or even extinguished.
Thus, while NAFTA is still generally regarded favourably
by a majority of Canadians, 7 its potential to negatively
impact on the preservation of core societal values and
traditions remains of concern. 8

Whereas the Government of Canada, the Government of
the United Mexican States and the Government of the
United States of America have entered into the North
American Free Trade Agreement having resolved to
. . . foster creativity and innovation, and promote trade in
goods and services that are the subject of intellectual property rights . . .
Whereas the Government of Canada has entered into the
Agreement having further resolved to strengthen Canada’s
national identity while at the same time protecting vital
national characteristics and qualities . . .

NAFTA represents one piece of a much larger and
ever-increasing network of treaties and international
agreements in the progressive push towards the harmonization of IP rights at the international level. 9 For
Canada, the challenge is to reconcile its rejection of
regional and global isolation (i.e., its desire to belong to a
regional and, indeed a multilateral world order) with its
rejection of assimilation (i.e., its desire to retain a certain
degree of sovereignty and national identity). Thus, an
acceptable balance must be found so that Canada can
reap the benefits of globalization while at the same time
successfully minimize the detrimental impact that international integration can have on national identity.

Thus, the Federal Government had as its objectives
the desire, on the one hand, to provide for ‘‘adequate and
effective’’ protection and enforcement of IP rights within
the NAFTA region and, on the other hand, the goal of
strengthening Canada’s national identity and its national
characteristics and qualities. However, these objectives

This paper will argue that domestic courts can provide a forum within which to mediate between these
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two extremes, to reconcile the ‘‘global’’ and the ‘‘local’’ —
but that the courts themselves must adapt to meet the
challenges that globalization places upon them. More
specifically, the paper begins by setting out a framework
for understanding harmonization of laws under NAFTA
as one that encourages rather than eliminates diversity of
law. The paper then studies the prevailing approaches to
statutory interpretation that Canadian courts, most especially the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal
Court of Appeal, have been employing in deciding IP
cases in a post-NAFTA environment to determine
whether any or all of these approaches could effectively
balance the ‘‘global’’ and the ‘‘local’’. This analysis is
intended as a starting point for further inquiry about the
role of domestic judicial decision-making in an era
increasingly marked by an impetus towards the global
harmonization of laws.

Understanding Harmonization of
Laws under NAFTA
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he concept of harmonization of laws is sometimes
equated with standardization, homogenization, and
uniformity. This view puts Canada’s objective of
strengthening its national identity most at risk. However,
there is another conception of harmonization that
would help achieve the Government’s competing
NAFTA goals. Professor Patrick Glenn has characterized
NAFTA as an arrangement designed to achieve ‘‘harmony’’ of laws.
Legal harmony here is not imposed, but is instead expected
to appear as a result of various, natural forces of both convergence and divergence. To harmonize would be here an
intransitive verb, an indication that various laws are in harmony, in the sense of coexisting in a non-conflictual mode
in spite of possible differences. In this perspective, there
would be no need for more affirmative, formal measures of
reform, or harmonization in a transitive sense. There is
much to indicate that this second, natural concept of harmony is one which already prevails in the Americas and one
which should continue to prevail. 10

The optimal outcome of treaty harmonization
would result in countries acting in ‘‘harmony’’ with one
another. Working in harmony is about internalizing
international concepts and norms in light of national
expectations, needs and differences. It is about remaining
true to one’s own history, experience and context,
including legal tradition, while at the same time
reaching out to the world. Viewed in this light, NAFTA
would foster a process of informal harmonization compatible with a diversity of legal outcomes, thereby
making it possible to achieve an appropriate balance
between integration and the preservation of national
characteristics and values. 11
In effect, NAFTA harmonization should be incremental and built upon a process of consensus-building
that recognizes a plurality of experiences and ideologies.
NAFTA should be about harmonious law-making, not
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uniform law-making. It should be about inclusiveness,
equality and complementarity — not about hegemony.
The process of informal harmonization is not . . . an evolutionary process. It does not project further levels of uniformity and elimination of diversity, but rather the reverse,
that uniformity is not an objective in itself and that harmony flows from recognition of diversity and the ability to
work within it. Measures of harmonization are thus not
imposed but allowed to develop, or at most encouraged.
The Americas would thus exist not as an evolutionary process, but as an equilibrium amongst its diverse peoples. 12

This notion of ‘‘harmony’’ is of particular interest in
the context of IP law, given that this body of law has had
a long history of being tied to international norms.
NAFTA, however, has added a qualitatively different
dimension. Pursuant to Chapter 17 of the treaty, the
recognition and protection of IP rights have been
enhanced and, most importantly, the mechanisms to
enforce these rights have been strengthened. 13
As a result, domestic courts are now having to
operate within a new legal paradigm in international IP
law — one in which the consequences of non-compliance are felt.
In this international IP environment, the pressure to
conform to homogeneous standards has increased. However, rather than automatically acquiescing to this
impetus towards uniformity of laws, domestic courts
need to respond in a forceful, persuasive and proactive
way. They need to develop new paradigms of interpretation that permit them to exercise some latitude to particularize, according to local needs, concepts whose parameters are fixed globally.
There is a need to actively reject the tendency
towards what Professor Harry Arthurs identifies as the
‘‘globalization of the mind’’; namely, the progressive,
reflexive ‘‘Americanization’’ of both Canadian substantive law and of the Canadian legal elites who make and
interpret law:
Given the specific circumstances of Canada, globalization of
the mind in particular has contributed to a convergence of
ideas, policies and behaviours as between Canadian elites
and their counterparts in the United States. Or, more accurately, conventional wisdom and practice in the two countries, in a number of areas, seem to have converged around
American models, while distinctive Canadian ways of seeing
and doing things appear to be drifting into eclipse. As a
consequence, Canadians are increasingly implicated in a
common ‘‘constellation of different legalities . . .’’ with their
powerful neighbour. The ‘‘legalities’’ in question include
legislation and legal doctrines. . . . 14

To counter this trend, he suggests that Canadian
knowledge-based elites, including the judiciary, be persuaded to ‘‘dilute, resist, subvert, even reverse, globalization of the mind’’. 15 Arthurs argues that:
. . . the privileged position of elites allows them to achieve
subtly and by indirection what, in many ways, the state
cannot achieve by formal action alone: a new set of attitudes
and understandings and, ultimately, new institutions and
new legalities. 16
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In this regard, the work of Boaventura de Sousa
Santos is most instructive. In his view, globalization is
not a process of homogenization or unification. Rather, it
is a dynamic, asymmetric and imperfect interaction
between four phenomena he identifies as ‘‘globalized
localisms’’, ‘‘localized globalisms’’, ‘‘cosmopolitanism’’
and issues belonging to ‘‘the common heritage of
humankind’’.
De Sousa Santos describes the first two phenomena
in the following terms:
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. . . I distinguish two forms of globalization. . . . The first one I
would call globalized localism. It consists of the process by
which a given local phenomenon is successfully globalized
. . . [for example] the worldwide adoption of American copyright laws on computer software. The second form of globalization I would call localized globalism. It consists of the
specific impact of transnational practices and imperatives on
local conditions that are thereby destructured and restructured in order to respond to transnational imperatives. Such
localized globalisms include: free trade enclaves . . .. In this
context, the international division of globalism assumes the
following pattern: the core countries specialize in globalized
localisms, while upon the peripheral countries is imposed
the choice of localized globalisms. The world system and,
more specifically, what in it is designated as globalization
are a web of localized globalisms and globalized localisms. 17

For de Sousa Santos, the homogenizing effects of
globalization driven by ‘‘globalized localisms’’ and ‘‘localized globalisms’’ are countered by the process of ‘‘cosmopolitanism’’ and the concern over matters that transcend
local interests (i.e., those that affect the common heritage
of mankind, such as environmental and fundamental
human rights issues).
It is de Sousa Santos’ description of ‘‘cosmopolitanism’’ that is of greatest interest in relation to countering the potential homogenizing effect of harmonization.
The prevalent forms of domination do not exclude the
opportunity for subordinate nation-states, regions, classes or
social groups and their allies to organize transnationally in
defense of perceived common interests, and use to their
benefit the capabilities for transnational interaction created
by the world system. Such organization is intended to
counteract detrimental effects of hegemonic forms of globalization, and evolves out of the awareness of the new opportunities for transnational creativity and solidarity created by
the intensification of global interactions. 18

The hegemonic and counter-hegemonic influences
that de Sousa Santos identifies underscore the complexity of globalization and its irreducibility to simplistic
formulaic generalizations. In this multi-directional, often
confrontational series of exchanges, globalization can
take in and ultimately respect not simply the needs of
the most powerful but also the social, political, and cultural preferences of all those groups and sub-groups that
populate the global landscape. In this dynamic process
then, there is room to manoeuvre. And although de
Sousa Santos himself does not specifically reflect on the
judicial system as itself being capable of ‘‘transnational
creativity and solidarity’’ through global interactions,

there is opportunity for courts to engage in counterhegemonic practices along the lines he identifies.
What each of these three scholars is suggesting is
that legal diversity and resistance to hegemony can arise
through meaningful dialogue and a willingness to
engage in transnational exchanges of ideas. By opening
up to the world, new understandings — even diverse yet
compatible understandings — can be nurtured and the
push towards ‘‘sameness’’ averted.
Building from these ideas and applying them to the
context of IP judicial decision-making, the challenge for
the courts is to ensure that they achieve ‘‘harmony’’ of IP
laws while at the same time avoiding automatic uniformity of outcomes. They must resist ‘‘globalization of
the mind’’ while at the same time engaging in the process of IP harmonization towards which they are increasingly impelled. They must become cosmopolitan while
remaining true to the legal tradition within which they
operate and which gives them their legitimacy. How do
they go about achieving this?

The Cosmopolitan Court — New
Paradigms for Decision-Making
Given understanding, a harmonious arrangement of the
diverse becomes possible. 19

Transjudicial Dialogue and the Supreme
Court of Canada: Opening up to the
‘‘Global’’
Increasingly, courts are ‘‘talking to one another’’ 20
across territorial boundaries. Indeed, dialogue between
courts is an active element in the process of informal
harmonization as defined by Professor Glenn:
Judges also engage increasingly in ‘‘judicial parallelism’’,
accompanied by transnational citation of judicial authority
where the form of judgments so permits, such that harmonization may emerge from patterns of jurisprudence. 21

Justice L’Heureux-Dubé of the Supreme Court of
Canada has long been a proponent of this sort of transjudicial dialogue, especially in light of increased globalization. She recognizes that ‘‘globalization is also occurring in the process of judging and lawyering’’ and that
‘‘growing international links and influences are affecting
and changing judicial decisions, particularly at the level
of top appellate courts throughout the world.’’ 22 She sees
this cross-pollination translate into ‘‘[j]udges around the
world look[ing] to each other for persuasive authority,
rather than some judges being ‘givers’ of law while
others are ‘receivers’. Reception is turning to dialogue’’. 23
Understanding this transformation in the process of
‘‘judging and lawyering’’ is critical to the formulation of
new approaches to decision-making in an increasingly
integrated legal order. Firstly, the fact that judgments are
increasingly being seen as persuasive rather than binding
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authority legitimates and indeed necessitates reference to
international and foreign bodies of law as relevant
sources of inspiration and interpretation. 24
Secondly, the persuasiveness of individual judgments in the way they interpret particular rules and
norms, especially those that have been promulgated by
way of international agreements, must not only resonate
within the territorial boundaries of the court’s jurisdiction, but must also speak to the global community as
well. This dialogue across jurisdictions would serve to
heighten the awareness that different perspectives on the
same rule or norm may lead to diverse but equally justifiable interpretations, thereby increasing resistance to the
pressure towards uniformity.
In step with these statements of principle, the
Supreme Court of Canada has rendered a number of
important decisions that have established that international agreements and other sources of non-binding law
are relevant as interpretive aids. 25 The Court premises
this view on the reality that Canada does not live ‘‘in
splendid isolation’’; 26 that it belongs to a larger international family with which it increasingly interacts; that it
forms allegiances, makes promises and binds itself to an
increasingly interconnected body of laws and policies
that it cannot then ignore domestically.
This perspective on interpreting domestic legislation has been applied by the Supreme Court of Canada
to the full gamut of cases — from those in which international agreements have been expressly implemented
into domestic law to those in which the legal principles
at issue were not adopted in direct reference to an international treaty obligation. 27 Further, these principles
have been introduced in relation to a broad range of
legal issues, not just those in which international law
concerns may appear most relevant, such as those
involving Charter 28 or human rights considerations. 29
Of greatest interest for the purposes of this paper are
the most recent pronouncements of Binnie J. of the
Supreme Court of Canada, in relation to IP law, that are
consistent with the recognition of the relevance of international norms in the interpretation of domestic legislation.
Speaking for the majority in Théberge v. Galerie
d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc, Binnie J. stated that:
Copyright in this country is a creature of statute and the
rights and remedies it provides are exhaustive. . . .
This is not to say that Canadian copyright lives in splendid
isolation from the rest of the world. . . . In light of the globalization of the so-called ‘‘cultural industries’’, it is desirable,
within the limits permitted by our own legislation, to harmonize our interpretation of copyright protection with
other like-minded jurisdictions. 30 [Emphasis added]

Binnie J. had occasion to repeat his views, albeit in
dissent, in the more recent Supreme Court of Canada
decision in Commissioner of Patents v. President and
Fellows of Harvard College, in which he asserted that:
Intellectual property has global mobility, and states have
worked diligently to harmonize their patent, copyright and
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trade-mark regimes. . . . Legislation varies, of course, from
state to state, but broadly speaking Canada has sought to
harmonize its concepts of intellectual property with other
like-minded jurisdictions.
The mobility of capital and technology makes it desirable
that comparable jurisdictions with comparable intellectual
property legislation arrive (to the extent permitted by the
specifics of their own laws) at similar legal results. . . . 31

From the foregoing, it can be seen that the Supreme
Court of Canada has put in place some of the groundwork to permit courts to fashion their judgments, taking
into account international IP norms and foreign sources
of law (the ‘‘global’’) as well as the ‘‘specifics of their own
laws’’ (the ‘‘local’’) with a view to achieving ‘‘harmony’’ of
laws. The question remains as to whether the lower
appellate courts have been following the direction set by
the Supreme Court in the way they have been interpreting the NAFTA-based amendments to Canada’s IP
legislation.

Interpreting NAFTA in IP Cases —
Balancing the ‘‘Global’’ and the ‘‘Local’’
Above all, NAFTA facilitates and multiplies legal exchange,
and legal understanding, between the NAFTA countries. 32

NAFTA as an Interpretive Aid:
General Considerations
Canada follows the British dualist tradition, such
that a treaty once ratified does not automatically form
part of Canadian domestic law. Thus, the traditional way
in which international obligations form part of binding
domestic law is through legislation specifically enacted
in order to implement them. 33
The NIA itself offers some clues about the way in
which Parliament intended the NAFTA itself to be considered by domestic courts. By virtue of section 10 of the
NIA, NAFTA is ‘‘approved’’. The use of this language in
implementing legislation has been held to signify that
Parliament’s intention was not to incorporate the treaty
by reference into domestic law. 34 This is consistent with
the dualist view that considers the implementing legislation as the governing body of domestic law — requiring
clear and unequivocal language to demonstrate an intention by Parliament to incorporate the text of the treaty
into domestic law. The use of the term ‘‘approval’’ does
not effect this result. Thus, any reference by the courts to
the text of NAFTA itself would have to be as an aid to
interpretation rather than as binding law.
The use of NAFTA as an interpretive aid is susceptible to a number of possible approaches along a spectrum from the most restrictive to the most expansive.
The most restrictive view of the relevance of treaties as
interpretive aids would posit that they are not relevant at
all — that the court’s sole mandate is to interpret the
legislation as Parliament enacted it without reference to
the international text from which the legislation was
derived. Thus, the court’s obligation would be to refer
any inconsistencies to the legislature for resolution. 35
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However, this form of ‘‘originalist’’ construction of statutes has largely fallen out of favour. The courts, most
especially the Supreme Court, have been critical of the
limitations inherent in this approach. 36 Bastarache J., in
Harvard Mouse, confirmed that ‘‘[t]his court on many
occasions expressed the view that statutory interpretation cannot be based on the wording of the legislation
alone’’. 37
On the next incremental step along the spectrum
lies the ‘‘ambiguity approach’’. This approach would not
exclude the treaty altogether, but rather would require
that the court first and foremost consider the text of the
domestic legislation, make an assessment as to its
inherent ambiguity, and then rely on the treaty as one of
a number of interpretive aids. 38 If the text of the
domestic legislation is not ambiguous on its face, the
court must not inquire further by looking to the international text for guidance to ensure consistency in its interpretation.

This ‘‘latent ambiguity’’ principle of statutory interpretation was established in National Corn Growers
Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal) 39 in the context of
considering the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) agreement in interpreting a section of the Special Import Measures Act, S.C. 1984, c. 25 that had been
enacted in order to implement Canada’s GATT obligations. The majority of the Supreme Court held that:
In interpreting legislation which has been enacted with a
view towards implementing international obligations . . . it is
reasonable for a tribunal to examine the domestic law in the
context of the relevant agreement to clarify any uncertainty.
Indeed where the text of the domestic law lends itself to it,
one should also strive to expound an interpretation which is
consonant with relevant international obligations. 40

For greater certainty, this Act, any provision of an Act of
Parliament enacted by Part II and any other federal law that
implements a provision of the Agreement or fulfils an obligation of the Government of Canada under the Agreement
shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Agreement. 41

More importantly, the Supreme Court in National
Corn Growers broadened the traditional rule that would
look to the international norm only in cases where the
text of domestic legislation was ambiguous on its face.
The Supreme Court took the unequivocal position that:
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This approach, however, has also been expressly
rejected by the Supreme Court in favour of the more
expansive ‘‘latent ambiguity’’ approach that suggests that
a treaty is always relevant to interpreting the text of a
provision expressly designed to implement it in order to
ensure that any latent ambiguities are fully resolved.

. . . it is reasonable to make reference to an international
agreement at the very outset of the inquiry to determine if
there is any ambiguity, even latent, in the domestic legislation. The Court of Appeal’s suggestion that recourse to an

international treaty is only available where the provision of
the domestic legislation is ambiguous on its face is to be
rejected. 42

As a result, a court must always consider the
domestic text in light of the international treaty obligations it was enacted to implement in order to ensure
‘‘harmony’’ between the two.
It is this rule of statutory interpretation that is the
most current statement of principle regarding the relevance of treaties as interpretive aids in the context of
legislation expressly enacted to implement them. Further, of the various principles of interpretation canvassed,
it is the ‘‘latent ambiguity’’ approach that is most consistent with the more general Supreme Court pronouncements on the relevance of international law on statutory
interpretation. In other words, the ‘‘latent ambiguity’’
rule is the concrete manifestation of the recognition by
the Supreme Court that Canadian laws no longer exist
‘‘in splendid isolation’’. Finally, it is the most ‘‘cosmopolitan’’ rule of interpretation and has the best chance of
ensuring ‘‘harmony’’ of laws while resisting ‘‘globalization of the mind’’. However, as will become apparent in
what follows, if misapplied, this rule of interpretation
runs the risk of resulting in precisely the outcome to be
avoided; namely, homogeneity and uniformity of law.
NAFTA, IP and The Federal Court of Appeal
In seeking to generate a typology of post-NAFTA
judicial decisions, this paper will look primarily at the
body of decisions emanating from the Federal Court of
Appeal on matters relating to patents, trademarks and
copyright. Although a full inquiry cannot end there, the
Federal Court of Appeal is a good place to start for a
number of reasons.
Firstly, even though it shares concurrent jurisdiction
on specific matters with provincial superior courts, the
Federal Court hears the vast majority of IP cases. 43 Thus,
the Federal Court of Appeal is often the final appellate
court to decide IP matters. 44 Secondly, it is both a
national and a bilingual court that includes judges
trained in both Canadian legal traditions. It is therefore a
court that itself is inherently diverse, bijural and bilingual — perhaps arguably more open to the type of ‘‘harmony’’ this paper advocates.
Although there are few relevant decisions upon
which to rely, there is a sense that the Federal Court of
Appeal is floundering — wavering between a desire for
the certainty of the traditional canons of interpretation
and a recognition of the illegitimacy of disregarding the
relevance of the international legal order.
In a series of patent decisions, the Federal Court of
Appeal has become increasingly conservative in its
approach. Shortly after the enactment of the NIA, the
Federal Court of Appeal adopted a view consistent with
National Corn Growers on the relevance of the treaty in
interpreting domestic law.
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In the 1996 decision of Eli Lilly and Co. v. NuPharm Inc., the Federal Court of Appeal, citing both
section 3 of the NIA and National Corn Growers stated:
Apart from section 3 it is, of course, clear law that an international treaty may be used to interpret domestic legislation. . . . 45

The fact that this was ‘‘clear law’’ at the end of the
20th century seems to have been lost on the Federal
Court of Appeal in the 21st century as it retrenched from
its earlier expansive position and adopted the more
restrictive view that the text of NAFTA was only relevant
where the provision designed to implement it was
ambiguous on its face. 46 In other words, the Court
returned to the ‘‘ambiguity approach’’ to interpretation.
In the 2002 decision of Baker Petrolite Corp. v.
Canwell Enviro-Industries Ltd the court stated:
The NAFTA has been approved by the [NIA]. However, this
does not give the provisions of the NAFTA themselves the
force of an Act of Parliament. I accept that an international
treaty may, where relevant, be used to assist in interpreting
domestic legislation. . . . However, the international treaty
cannot be used to override the clear words used in a statute
enacted by Parliament. 47
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One year later, the Federal Court of Appeal reiterated this position in Pfizer Canada Inc v. Canada (A.G.):
. . . while Parliament is presumed not to intend to legislate
contrary to international treaties or general principles of
international law, this is only a presumption: where the
legislation is clear one need not and should not look to
international law. 48

This return to the ‘‘ambiguity approach’’ is not consistent with the prevalent view of the relevance of international law in the domestic legal context as espoused
by the Supreme Court of Canada. It disregards the
simple truth that Canada’s IP laws, to an extent never
before seen, are tied to international agreements and to
an international normative order, regardless of whether
the specific provision in question was expressly amended
to conform to the international norm. This ambiguity
rule, while clearly providing a wide berth for interpreting
domestic legislation in isolation and so ensuring that the
local context prevails in most cases, will likely become
less and less helpful over time. It risks suffering the same
fate as the ‘‘originalist approach’’ to interpretation for the
same general reason; namely, that ‘‘. . . it fails to account
for the important interaction between the application of
statutes and the development of meaning’’ 49 — meaning
which is, whether we like it or not, increasingly being
defined at the international level through binding international agreements.
The ‘‘ambiguity approach’’ then is not likely to be of
use in difficult or conceptually controversial cases that
require meaningful interpretive solutions that can only
be arrived at by considering the international context. In
other words, while the courts may feel more comfortable
restricting themselves wherever possible to the terms of
domestic text as enacted by Parliament, they will find
that they are increasingly confronted with an interna-
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tional context that will become progressively difficult to
ignore. As per Justice Bastarache:
‘‘Globalisation’’ has perhaps become a cliché; but there can
be no doubt that more and more issues are coming before
Canadian courts involving individuals claiming redress on
the basis of international agreements binding Canada. The
conception of international law as concerning exclusively
state-actors has become a fiction as the subject-matter and
sheer quantity of international regulation has expanded and
as issues arising from that regulation become increasingly
pressing and unavoidable. 50

The ‘‘latent ambiguity’’ test, on the other hand, is
more in step with the present-day realities of the globalization of law. That said, this approach can itself be
inherently problematic, as made evident by the Federal
Court of Appeal’s decision in the copyright case of TeleDirect v. American Business Information Inc. 51
At issue in that case was the conceptually difficult
question of whether the standard of originality to be
applied to factual compilations under the Copyright Act
had changed as a result of an amendment to the definition of ‘‘compilation’’ that had been enacted pursuant to
Article 1705(b) of NAFTA. 52 In discussing the amended
definition of ‘‘compilation’’, the Court followed the dictates of the ‘‘latent ambiguity’’ rule by stating that:
The definition of ‘‘compilation’’ must be interpreted in relation to the context in which it was introduced. . . . It is
therefore but natural when attempting to interpret the new
definition to seek guidance in the very words of the relevant
provisions of NAFTA which the amendment intends to
implement. 53

Having concluded that the amendments to the
Copyright Act may not have fully implemented Canada’s
NAFTA obligations 54, the Court then read into the
Canadian legislation the following interpretation:
I can only assume that the Canadian government in signing
the Agreement and the Canadian Parliament in adopting
the 1993 amendments to the Copyright Act expected the
Court to follow the ‘‘creativity’’ school of cases rather than
the ‘‘industrious collection’’ school. 55

However, in order to validate this assumption and
in an effort to look for consistency between the domestic
legislative text and NAFTA, the Court should first have
ascertained the intent behind the treaty obligation,
which itself was susceptible of competing interpretations.
If this assumption had been substantiated by a review of
relevant extrinsic and intrinsic sources, then the Federal
Court of Appeal would have engaged in an appropriate
exercise of interpretation. Unfortunately, the Court
eschewed this type of analysis in favour of the unsupported assumption that NAFTA dictates that Canada
adopt a U.S. ‘‘creativity’’ standard for originality in factual
compilations. This is a most unfortunate misuse of the
‘‘latent ambiguity’’ principle that must be scrupulously
avoided.
In a similar vein, the Federal Court of Appeal further assumed that:

219
Another impact of the 1993 amendments may well be that
more assistance can henceforth be sought from authoritative
decisions of the United States courts when interpreting
these very provisions that were amended or added in the
Copyright Act in order to implement NAFTA. 56

As has been suggested, there is nothing unusual
about the courts looking to judgments from other jurisdictions as persuasive authority. In fact, this is the nature
of transjudicial dialogue that should be encouraged. One
must take issue, however, with the unsubstantiated
assumptions that NAFTA inescapably leads to uniformity of laws and that national courts must align their
decisions with those of their NAFTA partners — or at
least with those of the most powerful NAFTA partner,
the United States. 57
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Interpreting Canadian law with a view to the
outside world is exactly what must be done. To assume,
however, that Canadian law must automatically be read
in conformity with foreign law makes the court complicit in the hegemonic ideology of uniformity and
undermines the attempt to achieve a harmonious balance between the aims of trade integration and the preservation of some sense of national identity. This decision,
one might suspect, is an example of ‘‘the globalization of
the mind’’ that Professor Arthurs urges us to resist.
In fact, resistance to this line of reasoning did arise
swiftly from within the courts themselves. This took the
form of a spate of copyright decisions that challenged the
implications of the Tele-Direct decision. 58 The most significant of these was the 2002 Federal Court of Appeal
decision in CCH v. LSUC, 59 in which the Court revisited
Tele-Direct and concluded that ‘‘the copyright provisions in NAFTA were not intended to alter the standard
of originality in Canadian copyright law’’. 60 While not
opining specifically on the relevance of international
treaties as interpretive aids, the FCA in CCH nevertheless
considered it necessary to review the relevant provision
of NAFTA in order to give meaning to the Copyright Act
amendments, thereby implicitly adopting the ‘‘latent
ambiguity’’ principle of statutory interpretation.
In reaching the opposite conclusion from the Court
in Tele-Direct about the intent of Article 1705 of
NAFTA, the Federal Court of Appeal considered a
number of international and foreign sources, including
minutes and proceedings of the House of Commons
leading up to the passing of the NIA, a WIPO publication regarding the Berne Convention, and United States
case law and commentary on the ‘‘creativity standard’’. 61
In holding that NAFTA left the court free to fashion its
decision without having to resort automatically to the
laws of its NAFTA partners, the Federal Court of Appeal
remained consistent with the admonition in Théberge
and Harvard Mouse that harmonization of IP laws must
always be addressed within the specifics of the Canadian
legislation. Most importantly, by recognizing that there
can exist diversity of law among NAFTA countries, the
Federal Court of Appeal in CCH resisted hegemonic

conformity and rendered a decision that was consonant
with the concepts of ‘‘harmony’’ and ‘‘cosmopolitanism’’.
Obviously, it will not be every case in which the
international text leaves room for courts to maneouvre.
In many cases, the legislated principle will clearly and
unequivocally direct the courts to adopt the international norm as defined within the treaty. However, in
cases such as that of Article 1705 of NAFTA, in which a
full understanding of the international context would
justify the view that Canadian courts could interpret the
legislation consistently with Canadian legal principles,
the courts should not be so ready to reflexively favour
the laws of another jurisdiction solely on the assumption
that membership in a regional trade arrangement compels them to do so.

Final Comments and Conclusion

W

hile it is clear that the text of Chapter 17 of
NAFTA was largely driven by the IP policies of
the United States, this does not necessarily require that
Canada adopt, holus bolus, the substantive law of the
United States and thereby ignore its own legal context
and tradition. Once implemented, the treaty can and
does take on a life of its own — thereby providing
NAFTA countries with the ability to shape and reshape
their interpretations in order to work towards harmonious, but not necessarily uniform, solutions.
Scholars who advocate for legal plurality recognize
that globalization is not a static, unidirectional process,
but rather one that is dynamic, complex and multidirectional. Thus, the process of globalization depends very
much on the interaction between a multiplicity of actors
at a multiplicity of levels engaging with one another,
shaping, reshaping and reformulating rules.
Moving the concept of harmony of laws from
theory into practice requires concrete and meaningful
rules of interpretation. The Supreme Court of Canada
has been grappling with its changing role in an increasingly internationalized legal order, and has been progressively broadening the canons of interpretation to meet
the challenges of globalization. The way in which the
Supreme Court’s pronouncements trickle down to the
lower appellate courts needs to be considered.
The Federal Court of Appeal has been employing
two techniques in relation to interpreting the NAFTAbased provisions of the most important IP legislation.
The more conservative ‘‘ambiguity approach’’ remains
very much a part of the reasoning process at the Federal
Court of Appeal level, but may not be sufficiently outward-looking to survive the test of time in an increasingly integrated IP legal order. The more expansive
‘‘latent ambiguity’’ rule, if properly applied, holds more
promise in providing an effective approach to balancing
the international legal context with the domestic one.
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The courts, especially those at the appellate level,
will inevitably have to adopt a more global approach to
IP decision-making than they have hitherto taken.
Increasingly, the courts will be called upon to mediate
between the ‘‘global’’ and the ‘‘local’’ through judgments
that are both considered and contextual. Thus, it is critical that the courts develop approaches consistent with
achieving a ‘‘harmony’’ of laws. Such an approach would
require that judges become comparatists and globalists
as well as localists, that they develop a solid grounding in
both the external normative order and the domestic one,
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and that they identify the appropriate and effective rules
of statutory interpretation to guide them.
There is opportunity here to resist the ‘‘globalization
of mind’’ that is anathema to legal diversity, and to formulate the approaches necessary to recognize the
growing nexus between the global and the local. The
courts need to become more sensitive to the role they
play in this process, and the potential they have to influence outcomes both domestically, and perhaps more
importantly, internationally.
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